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Abstract This article examines the role of scientific evidence in informing health
policy decisions in Germany, using minimum volumes policy as a case study. It argues
that scientific evidence was used strategically at various stages of the policy process
both by individual corporatist actors and by the Federal Joint Committee as the regu-
lator. Minimum volumes regulation was inspired by scientific evidence suggesting a
positive relationship between service volume and patient outcomes for complex sur-
gical interventions. Federal legislation was introduced in 2002 to delegate the selection
of services and the setting of volumes for corporatist decisionmakers.Yet, despite being
represented in the Federal Joint Committee, hospitals affected by its decisions took the
Committee to court to seek legal redress and prevent policy implementation. Evidence
has been key to support, and challenge, decisions aboutminimumvolumes, including in
court. The analysis of the role of scientific evidence in minimum volumes regulation in
Germany highlights the dynamic relationship between evidence use and the political
and institutional context of health policy making, which in this case is characterized
by the legislative nature of policy making, corporatism, and the role of the judiciary in
reviewing policy decisions.
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InGermany, the idea of evidence-based policy as amodel ofmodern policy
making has not engendered as much enthusiasm as in other countries,
particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world (Jun and Grabow 2008; Knieps
2009). German policy makers and researchers are broadly in agreement
that scientific evidence has become more relevant over time to policy
making to address increasingly complex policy problems and provide
legitimacy for potentially unpopular decisions (Renn 1995;Mayntz 2009).
There is also an ever growing demand for expertise met by an array of
scientific advisory committees, research institutes, expert commissions,
and expert networks providing advice to government (Kloten 2006; Siefken
2007; Jun and Grabow 2008; Blum and Schubert 2013). This is particularly
visible in health care policy, in which scientific evidence use has become
institutionally embedded, for example, through the creation of the Institute
for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (Institut fu¨r Qualita¨t und Wirt-
schaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen or IQWiG) as a provider of indepen-
dent health technology assessments in the corporatist sector.
However, much skepticism about the role of scientific evidence exists
outside the narrow confines of health technology assessment, with some
commentators seeing references to evidence representing little more than
“scientifically cloaked lobbyism” (Knieps 2009: 273). The complexity of
the policy process in Germany—with its multitude of actors that exist
within a federal, corporatist system, and the dominance of legislation over
other forms of policy making—would not lend itself to support notions of
evidence-based policy.
This article will explore how health policy actors in Germany used
scientific evidence to promote their policy aims, using the case ofminimum
volumes as a pertinent example. Based on the idea that quality improves
with greater experience in a given procedure (“practice makes perfect”),
minimum volumes were introduced for a number of highly specialized
hospital services as ameasure of improving quality of care. It is notwithout
irony that the idea of regulating minimum volumes as a measure of quality
improvementwas initially inspired by research: studies in theUnited States
suggested that hospitals that performed a larger number of highly complex
surgeries produced better outcomes for patients than hospitals that pro-
vided these services less often (e.g., Birkmeyer et al. 1999). In Germany,
the idea of turning volume-outcome relationships into a policy proposal
has been credited to health economist and university professor Karl Lau-
terbach who, at the time, was an influential policy advisory to Federal
Minister of Health Ulla Schmidt. Minimum volumes were passed into law
in 2002 and have been specified and operationalized in the years that fol-
lowed, attractingmuch controversy as well as legal challenge from hospitals.
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Thepolicywas also introduced at the timeof the formation of theFederal
Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss or GBA) as the top
decision-making body of the (corporatist) self-administration in health
care. Given that the latest legal challenge of its decision on minimum
volumes only ended in December 2015, the discussion about minimum
policy allows for an analysis of the role of the GBA in professionalizing
health policy making, which also changed the role of scientific evidence.
The article will therefore examine the role of evidence at three different
stages of the policy process:
The making of the legislative framework taking place in the two
chambers of parliament, the Federal Assembly (Bundestag) and
Federal Council (Bundesrat);
The definition of minimum volumes by the “corporatist” self-adminis-
tration, represented by the GBA; and
Legal adjudication in the social courts, charged with reviewing the
legitimacy of minimum volumes set by the GBA.
The following section provides an introduction into the literature on stra-
tegic evidence use, followed by a description of the study methods and
summaryof the scientific evidencebase forminimumvolumes. Themiddle
section of the article is devoted to the analysis of the role of scientific
evidence at different stages of the policy process. The article finisheswith a
discussion and conclusion.
Background
Policy scholars have frequently noted the role of corporatism in health
policy in Germany, which has given organized interests a central role in
decision making (Lehmbruch 1988; Lijphart and Crepaz 1991). The state
has delegated a wide range of governance tasks to the respective associa-
tions of office-based doctors (i.e., family doctors as well as specialists),
hospitals, and sickness funds, which include, for example, decisions about
public reimbursement of pharmaceuticals and medical services, and the
definition of rules relating to quality assurance and reimbursement (Ban-
delow 2004). The same organized interests also have substantial influence
on lawmaking at both the federal and state levels. For a long time, political
parties had clear allegiances to specific interests, for example, the Social
Democrats (SPD) tending to support the role of sickness funds, while the
Free Democrats (FDP) sought opportunities to extend the scope of private
insurance—although these allegiances are not as clear as they used to be.
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Table 1 Key Organizations and Committees
Name of Organization
in German
Name of Organization
in English Function
Ausschuss Krankenhaus Hospital Committee Committee representing
hospitals and sickness
funds, mandated
with decision making
for the hospital
sector before 2004
Bundesrat Federal Council Chamber of parliament
representing elected
political parties
Bundestag Federal Assembly Chamber of parliament
representing the
governments
of the states (La¨nder)
Deutsche
Krankenhausgesellschaft
German Hospital
Association
Federal-level association
of hospitals
Federal (social) court Bundessozialgericht Court adjudicating social
security matters at the
federal level
Gemeinsamer
Bundesausschuss (GBA)
Federal Joint
Committee
Top decision-making body
of the corporatist self-
administration in health
care, since 2004
Gesundheitsausschuss Health Committee Parliamentary committee,
preparing health-related
legislation for
the Bundestag
GKV-Spitzenverband National Association
of Statutory Health
Insurance Funds
Association of sickness
funds at federal level
Institut fu¨r Qualita¨t und
Wirtschaftlichkeit
im Gesundheitswesen
(IQWiG)
Institute for Quality
and Efficiency
in Health Care
Institute commissioned by
the GBA to conduct
evidence reviews
Landessozialgericht State (social) court Court adjudicating social
security matters at the
state level
Vermittungsausschuss Mediation Committee Parliamentary committee,
mediating between the
Bundestag and Bundesrat
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Provider organizations, especially those representing office-based doc-
tors, used to be particularly influential, and able to leverage, and sty-
mie, policy proposals as veto players within decision-making processes
(Tsebelis 2011). Yet, over the years, the power dynamics between actors
have changed, bringing about new patterns of organizational behavior
(Bandelow 2009). Consecutive reforms have strengthened sickness funds
vis-a`-vis provider organizations (e.g., by changing voting rules in commit-
tees), thus shifting the balance between payers and providers (Bandelow
2009). The federal government has also become more assertive in setting
the national framework for corporatist decision making. This was accom-
panied by the creation of new organizations through the merger of several
associations of sickness funds into one, the GKV-Spitzenverband, and by
bringing together several committees to form the Federal Joint Committee
(GBA) (see table 1). The latter was aimed at professionalizing and for-
malizing the process of health policy making, and now forms the top
decision-making body within the corporatist sector (Gerlinger 2010).
Traditional alliances have also weakened, and lines of opposition
have become blurred. Physicians’ associations now face the difficulty of
representing doctors in primary and secondary care who are often pitted
against each other in questions of resource allocation. Likewise, the Ger-
man Hospital Association (Deutsche Krankenhausgesellschaft or DKG)
represents all hospitals providing publicly funded services, irrespective of
their size, ownership status, or types of service provided. Policy changes
such as the introduction of activity-based payments has also increased the
competition between hospitals for patients and funding. Thus, changes in
policy—be they targeted at cost control or at securing quality of care—
increasingly affect provider organizations in different ways, making it
more difficult for top associations to present a unified front. Commentators
noted, that while corporatist actors still wield substantial influence, the
nature of corporatism has changed over time and become more pluralist,
yet more adversarial and less consensual in style (Bandelow 2004). These
dynamics also play out in the “legalistic culture” ofGerman policymaking,
in which lawmaking and legal adjudication are crucial constituents of the
policy process (Strueck 2013). In this article, it is argued that the changing
style of decision making is also demonstrated in the increased role of
evidence use for both substantiating and legitimizing decisions.
Strategic Uses of Evidence in Health Policy Making
Carol Weiss observed in her 1979 article that scientific evidence can be
used for at least seven purposes (Weiss 1979). Instrumental use is what
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proponents of evidence-based policy usually have in mind when they
demand that research findings be taken account of in policy decisions.
However, Weiss argued that research typically influences policy in more
indirect ways, with knowledge from research filtering through to policy
makers over time and in often far more convoluted ways than ideas of
straightforward application would suggest. Political use implies that pol-
icy makers utilize scientific evidence in a more active manner, yet for
specific, politically driven purposes. Suchuse, also often called “symbolic”
or “tactical,” is therefore always selective, with policy makers choosing
those pieces of evidence that best promote their case. For the purists of
evidence-based policy, strategic use comes close to “policy-based evi-
dence,” defeating the purpose of the “objective” science of making policy
better informed and more rational (Marmot 2004).
However, for scholars of the policy process, selective use is by nomeans
a surprise. Majone (1989) was one of the first to argue that evidence is
typically used as ameans of persuasion, and as part of a political argument.
Greenhalgh and Russell (2007) found that evidence is often selected to
fit an “argumentation game” played by policy actors by employing rhet-
oric and mobilizing considerations of plausibility and reasonableness to
achieve their aims. From that perspective, evidence use is better described
as constitutive of the “social drama” of policymaking rather than seen as an
end in itself. Yet, there is always the question of who uses evidence stra-
tegically and for which purpose. Hind, for example, has warned that both
the state and corporations use science to legitimize their actions, which in
his view constitutes a serious threat to reasoning and rationality—the core
values of modern societies (Hind 2007).
The role of scientific evidence in legitimizing decisions has also been
extended to organizations. Boswell (2008), for example, has argued that
scientific knowledge plays a key role in legitimizing the role of the Euro-
pean Commission in immigration policy, a field that is frequently afflicted
with controversy.A similar observationwasmade byBijker and colleagues
(2009) in their study of the Gezondheidsraad (Health Council) in the
Netherlands. They observed that the Council successfully utilized the
authority of science to legitimize its advice to policy, which occurs—
paradoxically, as they argue—despite the fact that contemporary society
has become more critical of research and more aware of the limits of
science (for example, in relation to genetically modified food) (Weingart
1999). McNulty (2012) noted that aid organizations increasingly com-
mission program evaluation for the purpose of demonstrating compliance
with expectations of accountability and transparency.
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To be clear, the focus on strategic evidence use does not imply that
scientific research is useless in informing policy makers and in substanti-
ating policy thinking in view of improving outcomes. However, it does
raise the question of the motivation of policy makers to use evidence, and
highlights the existence of considerations that have more to do with the
nature of the policy process, the need to demonstrate accountability, and the
contested nature of decisions that affect the interests of policy actors than
with conceptions of purely instrumental evidence use (Suchman 1995;
Hansson 2006).
The case study of minimum volumes policy provides a pertinent
example of evidence use in the face of conflicting interests played out in a
corporatist system of health policy making. The case also parallels con-
troversies surrounding other decisions taken by the GBA, especially those
to exclude or limit publicly funded services using health technology
assessments (HTA) (Perleth,Gibis, andGo¨hlen 2009;Kieslich 2012). Such
decisions can be highly controversial, and pharmaceutical companies often
take the GBA to court to challenge unfavorable outcomes. The threat of
legal challenge requires the GBA to demonstrate the legitimacy of such
decisions, and it does so by reference to evidence reviews commissioned
from IQWiG, among other things. The role of HTA in legitimating poten-
tially unpopular decisions about resource allocation (i.e., prioritization,
rationing) has also been critically discussed in relation to NICE, the
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence in England (Syrett
2003; Littlejohns, Sharma, and Jeong 2012), which is internationally
recognized as a leader in this field. Yet, while the GBA has a similar
mandate and procedural arrangements are in place that are comparable
to NICE, the legal framework and corporatist structures in which the GBA
is embedded differ from the institutional context of NICE. For example,
NICE decisions are ultimately politically sanctioned by government (not
corporatist) actors, and are less likely to attract legal redress due to dif-
ferences in legal practice, while the GBA as a corporatist decisionmaker is
exposed to both influences of corporatist interests and opportunities for
legal challenge (Syrett 2004; Gress et al. 2005; Francke and Hart 2008;
Landwehr and Boehm 2011; Klingler et al. 2013).
Methods
This case study is informed by documentary analysis and interviews.
Documents include published protocols of parliamentary committees;
published records of court decisions; selected articles from several
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broadsheet newspapers reporting on minimum volumes such as Der
Spiegel, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Die Zeit and from profes-
sional journals such as Deutsches A¨rzteblatt; scientific reports published
by IQWiG and by researchers commissioned to undertake evidence
reviews; materials from websites such as policy documents relating to
minimum volumes published by the GBA and by corporatist organizations
as well as press releases published by these organizations.
The documentary analysis has been supplemented by a number of
interviews with key informants (n = 9), representing various types of
policy makers (government bureaucracy; corporatist organizations) and
researchers. Interviewees were selected because of their knowledge of,
and/or known involvement in, the process of developing minimum vol-
umes policy. The roles of individual interviewees will not be identified in
the following analysis to ensure the level of anonymity and confidentiality
agreed at interview.
Minimum Volumes in Hospital – Policy Idea
and Scientific Evidence
Since the 1970s, health services research in the United States and else-
where has suggested that for certain services, typically complex surgery,
hospitals that provided the service to a larger number of patients achieved
better outcomes for patients (i.e., lower mortality and morbidity) than
hospitals that provided the same service to a smaller number of patients
(Luft, Bunker, and Enthoven 1979). Interviewees suggested that studies
published by Birkmeyer and colleagues in the 1990s and early 2000s were
particularly influential in turning a statistically observed association of
volume and outcomes into a policy idea (Birkmeyer et al. 1999; Birkmeyer
et al. 2002; Birkmeyer et al. 2003; Finlayson, Goodney, and Birkmeyer
2003). The idea also appealed to policy makers as it resonated with the
common sense notion that “practice makes perfect.” Minimum volumes
had already been ubiquitously used in medical training and accreditation,
although they had not been used before to exclude hospitals fromproviding
a service.
Regulating minimum volumes also fit with the wider reform agenda for
hospitals at the time. There were two concerns, specifically: the perceived
inefficiency and costliness of hospital care compared to other countries,
and emerging concerns about variation in the quality and outcomes of care.
The first concern was to be addressed by the introduction of activity-based
payments as the main method of funding hospitals (Busse and Blu¨mel
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2014). For their proponents, namely sickness funds, minimum volumes
promised to speak to the second concern and to counter perceived risks to
quality associated with the first.
However, despite being a policy idea inspired by scientific research, the
scientific evidence base for operationalizing the policy proved challenging.
Evidence reviews suggested that there was a statistically significant rela-
tionship between higher volumes and improved outcomes for a number of
complex surgical interventions such as pancreatic resection or esopha-
gectomy (Geraedts 2002; Rathmann and Windeler 2002; IQWiG 2005;
IQWiG 2008). These studies were typically observational (i.e., nonex-
perimental) and were not considered as providing ultimate proof of cau-
sality. There were also limitations with regard to the data used in these
studies, which typically relied on routinely collected information andwere
limited to certain populations or countries orgroups of hospitals (e.g., in the
United States), raising questions about the transferability of their findings.
A further challenge was the difficulty of using studies indicating sta-
tistical correlations to support or set preciseminimum volumes for specific
procedures. Studies typically used definitions of “high” and “low” volumes
of service provisions, but these were set by researchers and driven by data
availability. In addition, most studies originated in the United States, with
studies using German data only emerging over time. But analyses of
German datawere also difficult to interpret and almost impossible to use to
inform minimum volumes. For example, in 2006, IQWiG, the research
institute associatedwith theGBA, published an analysis of data onvolumes
and outcomes of total knee replacement surgery, using two indicators of
outcome quality (postsurgical mobility and infection) that produced con-
flicting findings (IQWiG 2006).
In sum, while there was scientific evidence to support the selection of
services which could benefit from minimum volumes, there was limited
evidence to guide the selection of the specific volumes to be set in these
cases. This substantially reduced the potential for explicit “evidence-
based” decision making when it came to setting volumes. Minimum vol-
umes so far have not lent themselves to any straightforward translation of
“evidence into policy.” More importantly, however, they have been con-
troversial from the outset, pitting against each other sickness funds as their
proponents and hospitals as their vocal opposition. This conflict between
payers and providers played out through all stages of the policy process,
with controversy surrounding the interpretation of the evidence often being
at the center of the argument. In addition, minimum volumes—as a reg-
ulatory policy—created winners and losers among hospitals, with smaller
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hospitals with fewer patients likely to lose out to large teaching hospitals.
The opposition, represented in the German Hospital Association, was
therefore not entirely unified, making it more difficult for hospitals to
mount resistance.
Devising the Legislative Framework
In 2001 the federal government—then composed of Social Democrats
and the Green Party—brought a proposal for major reform of hospital
funding before parliament. The proposal involved replacing the previous
method of paying hospitals via budgets and per diems (payments per day of
hospital stay) through a funding approach predominantly based on activity-
based payments using diagnosis-related groups. The aimof this reformwas
to reduce perceived inefficiencies in hospital funding, reduce the length of
stay of hospital inpatients, which was one of the longest in Europe, and to
increase competition between hospitals. Minimum volumes were intro-
duced on the back of this reform, as a countermeasure to known risks to
quality associated with activity-based funding, as its proponents argued
(Interview). They had the added attraction—especially for sickness funds
and Social Democrats—of excluding hospitals with lower volumes from
providing certain services, thus providing a lever for facilitating structural
change in the (difficult to reform) hospital market.
Although the idea of regulating volumes of complex hospital services
was inspired by research, scientific evidence, unsurprisingly, did not fea-
ture widely in the parliamentary discussion in which the legal frame-
work for minimum volumes was developed. Instead, the procedural rules
of parliamentary decision making show a much clearer imprint on the
resulting legislation, published as part of the 2002 Act on Case-Based
Payment (Fallpauschalengesetz). In relation to minimum volumes, the
2002 Act stipulated that the relevant decision-making body of the self-
administration (at that time, the Hospital Committee and, from 2004, the
GBA) should identify hospital services for which “the quality of outcomes
particularly depended on the volume of services provided” and set mini-
mum volumes for such services (Bundestag 2002b). The Act has since
been integrated into Social Code Book V (Socialgesetzbuch [SGB] 5),
now forming part of paragraph 137.
As the bill concerned hospital funding, it directly touched on the legal
responsibilities of the states and therefore required approval of both cham-
bers of parliament. In the Bundestag, the bill was discussed in the Health
Committee, which introduced a number of amendments, including that
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minimumvolumes should only be applied to “planable” services ( planbar),
thus excludingurgent or emergency services. TheHealthCommittee (com-
posed of members of the Bundestag reflecting the proportionate repre-
sentation of its constituent political parties) also requested transitional
arrangements for hospitals that wanted to invest in expanding or creating
new services, for example, by employing a new specialist (Bundestag
2001a; Bundestag 2001b). While seemingly reducing the scope of mini-
mum volumes, the Health Committee also sharpened the bill by making
minimum volumes binding on hospitals (instead of using them as guide-
lines, as an earlier version suggested), and by preventing sickness funds
from reimbursing services if hospitals continued to provide them in
insufficient numbers. Taken together, the changes introduced by theHealth
Committee both suited the agenda of sickness funds and, to some extent,
may have mollified hospitals by limiting minimum volumes to elective
services only.
The states, represented in the Bundesrat, also made amendments to the
bill, as the documents of the Mediating Committee suggest. Specifically,
the Committee (composed of members of the Bundestag and the Bun-
desrat) made provisions that allowed states to exempt individual hospitals
from minimum volumes if they found access to services at risk within a
given geographic area (Bundestag 2002a).
There is no indication in the documents examined that parliamentary
committees concerned themselves with an interpretation of the scientific
evidence available in support ofminimumvolumes.However, the resulting
legislation, purposefully or unwittingly, included a clause where the spe-
cific wording lends itself to being interpreted as stipulating that specific
minimumvolumes had to be supported by scientific evidence. Specifically,
the Act stated that “the quality of outcomes particularly depended on the
volume of services provided” (Bundestag 2002b: 1413, emphasis added).
This clause had significant influence on how the law was subsequently
interpreted and applied both by corporatist policy actors (i.e., the associ-
ations in favor and against, as well as the GBA as decision-making body)
and by social courts involved in legal adjudication.
Setting Minimum Volumes – the Role of the Federal
Joint Committee
With the passage of the Act, federal legislators mandated the self-
administration to identify hospital services suitable for minimum volumes
and to set volume thresholds. This task fell initially on the Hospital
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Committee (Ausschuss Krankenhaus), formed by the top associations of
sickness funds, the German Hospital Association, and the Medical Asso-
ciation (A¨rztekammer), and, from 2004, to the newly formed GBA.
The legal mandate required associations of sickness funds and hospitals
(with participation from a number of other organizations, such as private
health insurers) to jointly identify the “catalogue of planable services” and
to set minimum volumes for these services (MMV [Mindestmengenvere-
inbarung], Vereinbarung gemaess Paragraph 137 Abs. 1 Satz 3 Nr. 3 SGB
5 - Mindestmengenvereinbarung.2002: 2). As constituents of the com-
mittee, both groups of associations brought their own positions and inter-
ests of their members to the negotiating table. Sickness funds, as noted
above, were keen to establish minimum volumes as a policy instrument for
quality assurance and structural change. The hospital association, in con-
trast, wanted to prevent their introduction and, as this had failed, to limit the
number of services minimum volumes would apply to and keep volume
thresholds low.
While unable to openly reject quality assurance as an objective, themain
strategy of the hospital association was to highlight the risks to patients
potentially arising from minimum volumes. These risks came in two fla-
vors: the first argumentwas thatminimumvolumeswould endanger access
to care for patients by reducing the geographic coverage of services:
In addition, the proposed bill suggests minimum volumes for hospitals.
Yet the application of minimum volumes can exclude hospitals [from
service provision] in an unjustifiedway,whichwould endanger access to
services for patients. (DKG 2002)
A second line of argument was that minimum volumes were insufficiently
supported by scientific evidence andwere “unfair” to low-volumehospitals
that would produce good outcomes (Interview). Legislators had pre-
empted the first line of argument by allowing state authorities to grant
exemptions on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of geographic equity.
However, the second argument—insufficient evidence—was more suc-
cessful in challenging the appropriateness of minimum volumes and
obstructing their implementation. This position has been maintained to
this day in a slightly modified version, with the hospital association argu-
ing that service volumes as a surrogate parameter are less meaningful, and
therefore more likely to be unfair, than indicators that measure quality
directly (DKG 2014). While this is scientifically correct, it also raises the
bar for regulation as it is not at all clear how other quality indicators would
be operationalized to impact hospitals’ practice of service provision.
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A first list of complex surgical procedures was agreed to by the Hospital
Committee in 2003, comprising liver transplants, kidney transplants,
complex surgery of the esophageal system and the pancreatic system, and
stem cell transplantation. For these services, thresholds were set between
five and twenty per hospital per year (liver transplantation, ten; kidney
transplantation, twenty; esophageal surgery, five; pancreatic surgery, five;
stem cell transplantation, ten to fourteen) (MMV, Vereinbarung gemaess
Paragraph 137 Abs. 1 Satz 3 Nr. 3 SGB 5).
Interviewees commented that these procedures had been considered
relatively uncontroversial, as their relative share in service delivery and
potential financial impact on hospitals was small and volume thresholds
were low (Interview). They were also reflective of the services analyzed
in existing studies (Geraedts 2002; Rathmann and Windeler 2002). The
limited selection of services and the low thresholds thus suggest a com-
promise between hospital and sickness fund associations on the lowest
common denominator. In contrast, minimum volumes proposed by sick-
ness funds (e.g., the Verband der Angestellten-Krankenkassen) had been
much more ambitious, for example, for esophageal and pancreatic surgery
(both 10), coronary surgery (100), carotid surgery (20), percutaneous
transluminal coronary angioplasty (150), and breast cancer surgery (150)
(Geraedts 2002).
In 2004, following the formation of the GBA, two further procedures
were added to the list: total knee replacement, and coronary surgery
(BMGS 2004). However, no volumes were set at the time and coronary
surgery—arguably a high-volume service—would not be pursued any
further.More controversially, in 2005, a threshold of fifty cases per hospital
and year was set for total knee replacements (BMGS 2005). Neonatal
services for babies with very low birth weight were added by the GBA in
2009 (GBA 2009). These two decisions involving services with high vol-
umes (knee replacement) and high costs (neonatal care) proved highly
contested and were both subsequently challenged in court by hospitals.
At the time, two “evidence reports”—one commissioned by sickness
funds and authored by Rathmann and Windeler (2002), and the other
commissioned by the Federal Chamber of Physicians and authored by
Geraedts (2002)—appeared to have influenced the selection of services for
minimum volumes. Both reports were able to identify procedures such as
complex surgery of esophageal tumors for which evidence of a robust
volume-outcome relationship existed. However, as these studies were
observational and relied on routine data, their authors took care to mention
that the evidence did not lend itself to suggesting volume thresholds. They
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also pointed out that the studies did not identify themechanisms, or factors,
thatwould explainwhy higher volumes produced better outcomes. In other
words, while these reviews established the problem and provided a ratio-
nale for action, they were unable to suggest specific solutions.
However, despite the known limitations of the evidence base, the 2003
agreement stipulated that future minimum volumes should be based on
scientific evidence. Specifically, it stated that decisions should be taken
based on “epidemiological and empirical knowledge” and applied in “a
transparent and rule-based process” (MMV, Vereinbarung gemaess Para-
graph 137 Abs. 1 Satz 3 Nr. 3 SGB 5: 1). Not only should future minimum
volumes require evidence of a causal relationship between volume and
outcomes, they also required proof that improved outcomes were pre-
dominantly caused by higher volumes (im u¨berwiegenden Teil). Thus, the
2003 agreement suggested that minimum volumes should only be set if
volumewas proven to be the decisive factor for variation in outcomes. This
wording echoed similar terminology in the law (in besonderem Mabe), but
further raised the bar as to which types of evidence were regarded as
sufficient. However, evidence of volume being more influential than other
factors was difficult to come by for practical reasons (i.e., such studies did
not exist), and scientific reasons (i.e., volume is a proxy for other factors,
and thus can never be decisive).
Unsurprisingly, this move toward evidence-based medicine justifying
minimum volumes was celebrated by the hospital association:
Paragraph 3 of the agreement includes a procedural rule that stipulates
that the setting of minimum volumes for certain services requires an
evidence-based process and scientific evaluation. (DKG, 2003)
In 2004, having replaced theHospital Committee, theGBAasked its newly
created research institute, IQWiG, to examine the evidence of a volume-
outcome relationship and to identify thresholds for total knee replace-
ment (IQWiG 2005). Published in 2005, the IQWiG report noted that a
volume-outcome relationship was plausible, but could not be proven in the
absence of experimental studies (IQWiG 2005). In addition, the analysis of
hospital data on volumes and outcomes for total knee replacement (using
the outcome measures “post-surgical mobility” and “infection after sur-
gery”) resulted in conflictingfindings,with one indicator showing a decline
in desired outcomes at higher volumes and the other showing steady
improvement. Individually and jointly, the analyses of these indicators did
not imply that there is an ideal volume threshold. A later report by IQWiG
relating to the treatment of very premature babies with very low birth
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weight also concluded that a causal relationship between volume and
outcomes was likely, but could not be regarded as ultimately proven due to
the absence of experimental studies (IQWiG 2008).
Since its inception, the GBA has been committed to stringent evidence
use, promptedby controversies over the reimbursement of pharmaceuticals
and medical procedures, often involving legal action from manufacturers.
There has also been a drive to professionalize procedures, with several
documents specifying GBA’s bylaws and code of practice. There was a
notable effort to apply similarly robust approaches to decisions on mini-
mum volumes, resulting in the commissioning of reviews and additional
data analyses prepared by IQWiG. In commissioning these studies, the
GBA explicitly followed established best practice, including the publica-
tion of protocols and peer review. In compliance with its bylaws, the GBA
provided explicit rationales for its decisions, made this information pub-
licly available, and gave due consideration to reports commissioned from
its research institute (GBA 2008).
Yet, despite this emphasis on procedural robustness, the GBA found
itself in a position in which it was impossible to base minimum volume
decisions on evidence alone. This happened because the scientific evidence
in support of a specific threshold was inconclusive. In addition, being a
membership organization, theGBAcontinued to be exposed to the partisan
interests of its member organizations, in one instance rejecting a study
brought in by the hospital association which aimed to demonstrate that a
volume-outcome relationship was nonexistent (GBA 2010). Thus, there
was substantial tension between two procedural rules, those set out in
bylaws which aim at ensuring transparency and due process, and those
associated with the corporatist nature of the GBA and the practice of
negotiating consensus between the organized interests in health care. In the
end, decisions about minimum volumes were taken by majority vote,
which overruled the resistance of the hospital association. Yet, this did not
end the controversy.
Adjudication by the Social Courts
Following the introduction of minimum volumes for total knee replace-
ment at a level of fifty per hospital and year, and of increasing existing
volumes for very premature babies from fourteen to thirty (GBA 2013),
several hospitals took legal action against sickness fundswhich had refused
to pay for services delivered at lower numbers than required.Both cases led
to a judicial review of theGBAdecisions at the state level (the Social Court
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of the Land at Berlin-Brandenburg, here referred to as “state court”), and,
subsequently, at the federal level (by the Federal Social Court, here, the
“federal court”).
Three questions were considered in the courts, specifically: (1)Whether
the GBAwas entitled to set minimum volumes that are binding on hospi-
tals; (2) whether the selection of services to apply minimum volumes to
was in compliance with the law (i.e., SGB 5), especially whether these
services were “planable” (in the case of services for preterm babies), and
whether therewas sufficient evidence of a “particular” relationship between
volume and outcome; and (3) whether the specific minimum volumes set
had been sufficiently justified by the GBA, including by recourse to scien-
tific evidence.
On the first question, the state and federal courts upheld consistently that
the GBAwas entitled andmandated by parliament to set bindingminimum
volumes; however, the courts emphasized that, in compliancewithGerman
administrative law, the GBA had to explain and justify such decisions
(BSG[Bundessozialgericht],Urteil vom12September 2012,B3KR10/12
R, Kassel, Bundessozialgericht; BSG Urteil vom 18 December 2012, B 1
KR 34/12 R, Kassel, Bundessozialgericht).
On the second question, the federal court ruled that services are legiti-
mately selected if they are “planable” in the sense that they can be accessed
without posing additional risks to patients arising, for example, from longer
journeys to (fewer) hospitals. In relation to care for very premature babies,
the court argued, referencing national and international studies, that the
benefits for mothers-to-be outweighed the risks associated with longer
travel (BSG, Urteil vom 12 September 2012, B 3 KR 10/12 R: para. 43).
The court thus rejected an interpretation of “planable” as “elective” or
“predictable,” as both terms would not consider the balance of risks and
benefits to patients (BSG, Urteil vom 12 September 2012, B 3KR 10/12 R:
para. 30).
The courts also referred to research to clarify themeaning of the lawwith
regard to the “particular” causal relationship between volumes and out-
comes required by law to justify specific minimum volumes. In 2011 the
state court ruled that a causal relationship could only be regarded as
“particular” if “controlled studies” suggested a statistical relationship
(LSG [Landessozialgericht], Urteil vom 17 August 2011, L 7 KA 77/08
KL: para. 87). The state court thus aligned the wording of the law with the
concept of the “hierarchy of evidence” used in evidence-based medicine,
which considers randomized controlled trials (RCTs) as the strongest
research design to establish claims of causality.
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This ruling was revised by the federal court in 2012 and confirmed in
subsequent decisions in 2014 and 2015. The federal court argued that the
law should not be interpreted as giving preference to particular types of
studies, especially since, in the case of minimum volumes, RCTs were
neither practical nor ethical. Evidence from scientific studieswould suffice
if a causal relationship was “probable and plausible” (BSG, Urteil vom 18
December 2012, B 1 KR 34/12 R: para. 31). However, such decisions
would require additional support in the form of “medical experience”
(medizinische Erfahrungssa¨tze) (BSG, Urteil vom 18 December 2012, B 1
KR 34/12 R: para. 39). Such medical experience is often used in court
decisions by inviting expert witnesses (Sachversta¨ndige), although in this
case, the courts largely relied on written statements from the GBA in
justification of its position.
The third question discussed by the courts was whether specific mini-
mum volumes had been sufficiently explained and justified by the GBA.
The review of such justifications drew heavily on scientific evidence,
although courts came to different conclusions about the level of justifica-
tion needed for minimum volumes to be considered legal. For the state
court in 2011, evidence was insufficient in the absence of experimental
studies, which meant that the minimum volumes in question were unjus-
tified (LSG, Urteil vom 17August 2011, L 7 KA 77/08 KL). Rejecting this
ruling, the federal court argued—in line with its earlier reasoning—that
minimumvolumeswere sufficiently justified if theywere likely to improve
outcomes, if the statistical association would be supported by “medical
experience,” and if potential risks arising from minimum volumes (e.g.,
longer distances) would be outweighed by the potential benefits (BSG,
Urteil vom 12 September 2012, B 3 KR 10/12 R; BSG, Urteil vom 14
October 2014, B 1 KR 33/13 R, Kassel, Bundessozialgericht).
This weighing of risks and benefits led the federal court to come to
different conclusions when considering specific minimum volumes. It
argued thatminimum volumes of fourteen cases of very preterm babies per
year were justified, noting that fourteen cases (roughly one per month)
were sufficient to require the presence of a specialist team in a hospital. The
existence of such a teamwould make quality improvements plausible. In a
similar vein, it argued that fifty total knee replacements (roughly one per
week on average) would be sufficient to require the hospital to employ a
specialist team (BSG, Urteil vom 12 September 2012, B 3 KR 10/12 R;
BSG, Urteil vom 14 October 2014, B 1 KR 33/13 R).
Using the same rationale, the federal court rejected minimum volumes
of thirty per year for very preterm babies on the grounds that the higher
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threshold would increase the risks to those babies by excluding hospitals
with lower volumes (but potentially providing good quality services) with-
out necessarily increasing the benefits (BSG, Urteil vom 18 December
2012, B 1 KR 34/12 R: para. 60–61). It specifically cited four studies in
support of this suggestion, one of which had been included in a systematic
review (i.e., by IQWiG) and another one had been rejected by the GBA in
an earlier version and was co-funded by the hospital association (GBA
2010; Kutschmann et al. 2012). While these studies made valid points
about the limited ability of minimum volumes to separate high from low
performing hospitals entirely accurately, the ruling gave prominence to a
few selected studies while disregarding all the others included in previous
scientific reviews.
In conclusion, the analysis of court decisions suggests that scientific
evidence was of relevance to the legal adjudication on minimum volumes
to establish whether specific minimum volumes set by the GBA were
sufficiently justified in the eyes of the law. However, the decision itself was
not based on evidence but on principles of plausibility and proportionality
established in legal practice, which were then supported by research. Key
to establishing conformity with the law was that the setting of minimum
volumes was demonstrably proven to have been deliberated, with con-
sideration given to the available evidence, and that a justification was
provided that could be reviewed in court.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article has examined the development of minimum volumes policy as
a case study of health policy making in Germany. It specifically analyzed
the policy process and theway inwhich policy decisionswere supported by
evidence. It has argued that evidence use was mostly strategic: corporatist
actors such as the hospital association and sickness funds commissioned
research to support their aims; the hospital association consistently pro-
moted evidence use (specifically the “highest” level of evidence, such
as RCTs, which for minimum volumes does not exist) as a cornerstone
of decisions on specific minimum volumes; it also brought in its own,
co-funded studies to underline its position that minimum volumes do not
make a meaningful contribution to quality assurance.
The formation of the GBA and IQWiG in 2004 has changed the rules of
the argumentative game, with new procedures developed for, and applied
to, decision making and scientific evidence use. Decision making had
previously been dominated by the consensual arrangements characteristic
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of corporatism. Consensual arrangements have been maintained in the
GBA to some extent; however, decisions are eventually taken by majority
vote, which means that resistance by providers can be overcome provided
there is a majority. Decision-making procedures have become more rule-
based, for example, as they relate to commissioning evidence reviews
from the IQWiG and considering its findings. This suggests that scientific
evidence has become a substantial aspect of the GBA’s approach to legit-
imizing its decisions in relation to minimum volumes. This resonates with
findings from Boswell (2008), and Bijker and colleagues (2009), which
describe the transfer of scientific authority to decision-making bodies as
helping them to legitimize their actions. Similar observations have been
made in relation to decisions involving HTA where the legislature has
recently tightened the framework for decisions for inpatient services, pre-
venting the GBA from excluding services in the absence of evidence. New
hospital services have to be proven to be either less effective than existing
treatments or harmful, thus setting a high bar to evidentiary support for
decisions about service exclusions (Olberg, Perleth, and Busse 2014).
Still, in relation to minimum volumes, the analysis also echoes findings
that emphasize the negotiated nature of decisions (Etgeton 2009), sug-
gesting that policy actors that are constituent members of the GBA engage
in strategic uses of evidence to support their claims and promote their
interests. Corporatist structures have changed and become more pluralist,
adversarial, and less consensus-oriented. While some have argued that the
GBA is particularlywell placed for taking unpopular decisions in contested
policy fields such as service exclusions from the public benefits package
(Gerlinger 2010), the present state of affairs suggests that such decisions
often end up in court. Courts then weigh the scientific evidence provided
in support of a decision to establish whether the GBA has provided a
sufficient justification, although cognizant (perhaps increasingly so) of the
limits of such evidence. This analysis suggests, however, that substantive
disagreements between different organized interests do not disappear by
evoking the authority of scientific evidence. Evidence use as a “techno-
cratic fix” is unlikely to solve the legitimacy problems of organizations
charged with unpopular decisions (Syrett 2003). Decisions that directly
affect the interests of policy actors—perhaps especially so if there are
financial implications and impacts on notions of professional autonomy—
are likely to remain contested and have a fair chance to require legal
adjudication. The GBA is routinely taken to court by pharmaceutical
producers (and sometimes patients) contesting decisions to excludemedic-
inal products from public reimbursement, which is a well-trodden (though
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not necessarily successful) avenue given that access to legal review is easy
in the German legal system. In this case, smaller hospitals are particularly
likely to be affected by minimum volumes and, while the hospital asso-
ciation opposed the policy almost throughout (although there are signs of
partial acceptance following repeated confirmation by the judiciary [DKG
2014]), hospitals affected by the policy have found their interests directly at
stake and have sought legal redress individually.
The policy process analyzed here arguably does not tell the full story of
minimumvolumes, as it focuses on three specific stages of decisionmaking
while largely ignoring the dynamics of agenda-setting prior to the parlia-
mentary debate, and the actual impact of minimum volumes in practice.
There is now clear evidence that minimum volumes regulation is widely
ignored by hospitals, and sickness funds are incapable of retrieving funding
from hospitals if services turn out to have been delivered in volumes below
the threshold (de Cruppe´, Malik, and Geraedts 2014; Peschke, Nimptsch,
and Mansky 2014).
Court decisions also have tended to directly affect how the GBAwent
about making decisions, with some noting that the first court cases led to
more attention being given to future evidentiary support for decisions. This
also led to the GBA curtailing its introduction of further minimum vol-
umes. Meanwhile, sickness funds have asked parliament to change the
wording of the law to reduce the requirement on evidentiary support for
minimum volumes (Leber 2014). A proposal by the Federal Cabinet is
currently being discussed in parliament. It would remove the phrase in
besonderem Mabe (i.e., the particular relationship of volume and out-
come) from the law tomake specificminimumvolumesmore defensible in
court and introduce a process that would make it easier for sickness funds
to withhold funding from hospitals for services under the threshold
(Bundestag 2015). Whether this will increase the number of minimum
volumes introduced by the GBA in the future and, indeed, further change
the balance between payers and providers in the still corporatist system of
health policy making in Germany remains to be seen.
The analysis above has shown that various forms of strategic evidence
use dominate the example ofminimum volumes policy in Germany.While
it is clear that strategic use of evidence does not entirely preclude notions of
“evidence-based policy”—as evidence can also have a substantive impact
on decisions—this analysis suggests that expectations of “instrumental”
evidence use are likely to be disappointed. Changes in corporatist decision
making, namely, the formation of the GBA, have brought about new
opportunities for evidence use, necessitated by the GBA’s need to legitimize
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its decisions, including in court. But this has not reduced the potential
for contestation or fully established the idea of instrumental (i.e., objective)
evidence use.
These findings hint at the contextual nature of evidence use in policy
making, which is shaped by the specific institutional arrangements of
health care governance and the wider political system that influence the
motivation of policy actors and organizations to use evidence to legitimize
decisions.While the case of minimum volumes has shown that evidentiary
support is necessary for such GBA decisions, evidencewas not the only, or
indeed most relevant, source of legitimacy, as legitimation is also derived
from parliamentary lawmaking, corporatist governance, and legal adju-
dication by the judiciary.
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